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EGIONAL Integration in Latin America comprises four impor-
tant features, which can be described as the granting of differen-
tial treatment and preferences, politically led processes, highly
institutionalised structures and forums, and antithetic positions towards
external markets. These qualities have played a key role in the successes
and failures of the diverse schemes established within the region. Differ-
ential treatment is considered not only a peculiarity, but also a principle
of economic integration in the region. It may, however, create complexi-
ties and bring about weakness and legal uncertainty. Political direction
could become political intrusion. Institutions, structures, and forums may
turn dysfunctional, and external relations could be based on policies that
leave the region vulnerable to external shocks.
These core aspects of South-South Latin American integration are em-
bodied within the definition of open regionalism, a policy upon which
countries have relied since the mid 1990s. A decade after being imple-
mented, its purpose is far from being reached. There is a need to articu-
late the various regional, sub-regional, trilateral, and bilateral treaties in
order to direct open regionalism towards more effective multilateralism.
The evolution and dynamism of the process have produced a complex
network of bodies, institutions, and organs, all of which have lost their
influence in procuring the required convergence, coordination, and
cooperation.
By reexamining the Latin American and the Caribbean integration
framework, and by correcting the weaknesses present in the features con-
sidered, the region as a bloc will find a balanced immersion in the global
economy. In order to discuss these issues, the article is divided into five
sections. The first four identify, describe, and evaluate each one of the
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qualities present in the South-South Regional Integration processes in
Latin America, considering their interdependence with the concept of
open regionalism. Section V summarizes and provides some concluding
remarks.
II. OPEN REGIONALISM AND THE MAIN FEATURES OF
THE REGIONAL INTEGRATION PROCESSES
IN LATIN AMERICA
Regional integration is not a novel concept in Latin America. Promi-
nent citizens and statesmen had already discussed the prospect of inte-
grating the nations of the southern part of the continent during the first
decades of the nineteenth century.1 Latin American integration was the
unfinished political dream of "El Libertador," Simon Bolivar, after eman-
cipating Andean countries from Spanish rule between 1817 and 1820.2
Although not ultimately successful, Bolivar moved towards the accom-
plishment of this aim by inviting neighboring heads of state to meet in
Panama to consider the creation of a Confederation of States. 3
The first attempt to establish a free trade area among the countries in
South America was proposed in 1889 at the First International Confer-
ence of the American States.4 Diverse approaches have been applied to
obtain the desired goal of sustained development through economic inte-
gration. After more than three decades of regional, sub-regional and bi-
lateral efforts, differential treatment, politically led processes, highly
institutionalized structures and forums, and antithetic positions towards
external markets are regarded as the main features of regional integra-
tion in Latin America.
In addition, open regionalism is the principle upon which different
models of regional integration in developing countries, such us the Asia-
Pacific Economic Cooperation5 and the six arrangements actually in
1. Juan Mario Vacchino & Telasco Pulgar, Integration Agreements and the Latin
American Community of Nations, 53 CAPITULOS DEL SELA 113, 113 (1998)
(discussing the early stages of regional integration).
2. See art. 2 of the unsigned Treaty for perpetual unity, league and confederation of
the Latin American Countries or the Amphictyonic Congress of Panama, 1824,
quoted in PERMANENT SECRETARIAT OF THE LATIN AMERICAN ECONOMIC SYS-




4. Id. at 5; see also Rubens Antonio Barbosa GCVO, The Evolution of the Integration
Process in South America, in THE MERCOSUR CODES Xi (Marta Haines Ferrari
ed., 2000).
5. The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) was established in 1989.
APEC's twenty-one Member Economies are Australia; Brunei Darussalam; Ca-
nada; Chile; People's Republic of China; Hong Kong, China; Indonesia; Japan;
Republic of Korea; Malaysia; Mexico; New Zealand; Papua New Guinea; Peru;
The Republic of the Philippines; The Russian Federation; Singapore; Chinese
Taipei; Thailand; the United States; and Viet Nam. Asia-Pacific Economic Coop-
eration, About APEC, http://www.apec.org/apec/about-apec.html (last visited Oct.
5, 2005).
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place in Latin America and the Caribbean, 6 have carried out economic
integration. Different attempts to define open regionalism have been
made. Some conceive open regionalism as the reduction in barriers on
imports from non-member countries as a consequence of the liberaliza-
tion of trade among members.7 Others go beyond trade liberalization
and associate open regionalism with social access. 8
Bergsten proposes five possible definitions for open regionalism: (1)
open membership in the regional arrangement; (2) unconditional most-
favoured-nation (MFN) treatment by which trade liberalization would be
extended unconditionally to all of the members' trading partners, with no
new preferences or discrimination created; (3) conditional MFN, under
which a group would offer to generalize its reductions of barriers to all
non-members that agreed to take similar steps; (4) global liberalization,
meaning continuous reduction of barriers on a global basis while pursuing
each group's regional goals; and (5) trade facilitation through non-tariff
and non-border reforms.9
This article in turn considers open regionalism from the perspective
introduced by the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin
America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) in the mid 1990s. 10 It was a re-
sponse to the changes towards regional integration in the early 1990s. Al-
though the policy of import substitution, which it advocated in the 1960s,
was left aside, ECLAC continued to provide guidance to the process of
economic integration within the context of openness in which all econo-
mies of the region were involved. As stated by ECLAC, open regional-
ism is
a process of growing economic interdependence at the regional level,
promoted both by preferential integration agreements and by other
policies in a context of liberalization and deregulation, geared to-
6. They are the Latin American Integration Association (regional); the Central
American Integration System (sub-regional); the Central American Common
Market (sub-regional); the Caribbean Community and Common Market (sub-re-
gional); the Andean Community (sub-regional, countries located in the North
Cone of South America); and the Common Market of the South (sub-regional,
countries located in the North Cone of South America).
7. Defined as external liberalization by trade blocs. See Wei Shang-Jin & Jeffrey A.
Frankel, Open Regionalism in a World of Continental Trade Blocs 440-453 (IMF
Staff Papers 45, No. 3, 1998), http://www.imf.org/external/Pubs/FT/staffp/1998/09-
98/pdflwei.pdf.
8. See Clark W. Reynolds, Open Regionalism Lessons from Latin America for East
Asia (Kellogg Inst. for Int'l Studies, Working Paper No. 241, 1997), http://www.
nd.edu/-kellogglWPS/241.pdf.
9. C. Fred Bergsten, Open Regionalism (Institute for International Economics, Work-
ing Paper 97-3, 1997), http://www.iie.com/publications/WP/1997/97-3.htm.
10. ECLAC is the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the
Caribbean. Its Spanish acronym is CEPAL. ECLAC has developed its own school
of thought that was extremely influential within the region during the 1950s and
1960s. Its historical structuralism was based on the ideas and work of Raul
Prebisch, Celso Furtado, and Jorge Ahumada, among others. See ECLAC, About
ECLAC: The Institution, http://www.eclac.org (last visited Oct. 5, 2005); see also
Bela Balassa, Regional Integration and Trade Liberalization in Latin America, 10 J.
COMMON MKT STUD. 58, 59-60 (1971) [hereinafter Balassa, Regional Integration]
2005]
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wards enhancing the competitiveness of the countries of the region
and, in so far as possible, constituting the building blocks for a more
open and transparent international economy.'1
Open regionalism contains two antithetical propositions. 12 On the one
hand, it advocates regional integration as opposed to multilateral or
global integration. Regionalism implies certain preferences among the
members and a degree of protection against non-members. On the other
hand, it proposes openness to other countries, blocs, and economies
through different means, among them, multilateralism. This two-fold def-
inition implies an enormous degree of multiple interactions: first, those
within the region, sub-regions, and bilateral arrangements and second,
those outside the region, sub-regions, and other arrangements that could
be negotiated and agreed in blocs or individually. 13 There is a high de-
gree of difficulty in finding the right balance among the particular con-
cerns and interest of the member countries of the region or sub-regions,
and those of the region as a whole, in the negotiations with other coun-
tries and blocs.
The following sections analyze the contents of the proposed definition
against the four features identified along the historical development of
the South-South regional and sub-regional integration in Latin America.
III. DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT AND PREFERENCES
The principle of differential treatment, aimed at balancing the asymme-
tries present among the countries in the area, has been introduced in al-
most all South-South agreements in the region. Small and middle size
countries react against arrangements that do not consider their different
levels of development.
The Latin America Free Trade Association (LAFTA) was the first re-
gional attempt to attain economic integration, 14 created with the aim of
11. ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN, OPEN RE-
GIONALISM IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: ECONOMIC INTEGRATION
AS A CONTRIBUTION TO CHANGING PRODUCTION PATTERNS WITH SOCIAL EQUITY
(1994) [hereinafter OPEN REGIONALISM]; see also Gary C. Hufbauer & Barbara
Kotschwar, The Future Of Regional Trading Arrangements in the Western Hemi-
sphere, in BUILDING A PARTNERSHIP: THE CANADA-UNITED STATES FREE TRADE
AGREEMENT (Mordechai Kreinin ed., 2000); see also GUIDE, supra note 2, at 9.
12. Eduardo Mayobre, The Rules of the World Game and Latin America's Foreign
Policy, 53 CAPITULOS DEL SELA 51, 60 (1998) (commenting on the concept of
open regionalism).
13. Latin American Economic Systems Permanent Secretariat, Some Thoughts of the
Dynamics on Latin America's and the Caribbean's External Relations, 55
CAPITULOS DEL SELA 7, 8-9 (1999) (discussing the implications of open
regionalism).
14. The Montevideo Treaty of 1960 was signed first by Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mex-
ico, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay. Colombia (1961), Ecuador (1961), Venezuela
(1966), and Bolivia (1967) joined in later. Treaty Establishing a Free-Trade Area
and Instituting the Latin American Free Trade Association (Montevideo Treaty)
(with Protocol), Feb. 18, 1960, 1484 U.N.T.S. 223 [hereinafter MT60]; see Richard
Higgott, From Trade Led to Monetary-Led Regionalism: Why Asia in the 21st
Century will be different to Europe in the 20th Century 9 (UNU/CRIS e-Working
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establishing a regional free trade area. 15 It involved countries with di-
verse levels of development, size, and political interests. Argentina, Mex-
ico, and Brazil, as the most industrialized countries within the area, had a
clear interest in securing a wider market for their products, while smaller
and underdeveloped countries focused on creating industrial develop-
ment.1 6 This imbalance in the 1960 Treaty of Montevideo was perceived
as a disadvantage to the less industrialized countries of the region, as the
promised benefits failed to reach all countries involved.1 7 As the market
forces allocated resources to the countries with important levels of indus-
trial development less developed countries in the area found themselves
in an unsustainable situation. 18 Then, they began to spill over.1 9
Sub-regional agreements appeared in the late 1960s and early 1970s as
the reaction of small countries against the effects brought upon them by
LAFFA. The Andean Pact 20 and the Caribbean Community and Com-
mon Market 2 (CARICOM) were established. These agreements, as op-
Papers W-2002/1, 2002), http://www.cris.unu.edu/admin/documents/pa-
per%20richard %20higgott.pdf.
15. MT60, supra note 14, at arts. 1-2.
16. Barbosa, supra note 4, at xiv; see also Miguel S Wionczek, The Rise and the Decline
of Latin America Economic Integration, 9 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 49, 59 (1970).
17. Robert Devlin & Antoni Estevadeordal, What is New in the New Regionalism in
the Americas? 23 (Inter-American Development Bank, Working Paper No. 6, IN-
TAL-ITD-STA, 2001), http://www.iadb.orglres/publications/pubfiles/pubs-106.pdf
[hereinafter Devlin & Estevadeordal, New Regionalism]; Kevin J Middlebrook,
Regional Organizations and Andean Economic Integration, 17 J. COMMON MKT.
STUD. 62, 64-65 (1978); David Hojman, The Andean Pact: Failure of a Model of
Economic Integration, 20 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 139, 139 (1981); William P. Av-
ery and James D. Chochrane, Innovation in Latin American Regionalism: The An-
dean Common Market, 27 INT'L ORG. 181 (presenting a comprehensive
quantitative assessment of LAFTA's fulfillment of the distribution of economic
integration benefits).
18. RICARDO FFRENCH-DAVIS, EL PACrO ANDINO, UN MODEL ORIGINAL DE IN-
TEGRACION [THE ANDEAN PACT: AN ORIGINAL MODEL OF INTEGRATION] 32 (Er-
nesto Tironi ed., 1974).
19. The following explanation of the concept of "spill-over" is found in William P.
Avery & James D. Cochrane, Subregional Integration in Latin America: The An-
dean Common Market, 11 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 85, 86 n.3 (1972) [hereinafter
Avery & Cochrane, Subregional Integration]:
Moving to a higher level of integration in order to overcome dissatisfaction
is termed "spill-over" in the neo-functionalist theory of regional integration.
The "spill-over" concept describes a situation in which dissatisfaction, fear,
concern, or unfulfilled aspirations at one level of integration or with integra-
tion in one economic sector leads the participants, or a segment of them, to
expand the scope or level of integration, or both, in order to fulfill aspira-
tions, or overcome dissatisfaction, fear, or concern.
20. The Cartagena Agreement was signed in 1969, setting up the Andean Group or
Pacto Andino, with the aim of creating a customs union. The Andean Community
and the Andean Integration System started operating in 1997 when the Protocol of
Trujillo (1996) started to apply. See Andean Community, Who Are We?, http://
www.comunidadandina.orglingles/who.htm.
21. CARICOM is a customs union established in 1973, set up between Antigua and
Bermuda, the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Ja-
maica, Montserrat, St. Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grena-
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posed to LAFTA, were composed of a more homogeneous grouping of
countries, territorially linked and with related types of economies. 22
In 1965, upon the request of the Chilean President, four economists
presented the Proposals for the Creation of the Latin American Common
Market.23 They pointed out the need for preferential attention to less
developed countries within the region. Raul Prebish stated that
the success of integration depends on all the countries effectively
having an equal opportunity to benefit from the establishment of a
common market. The relatively less developed countries therefore
require preferential attention and special treatment, particularly in
three fundamental areas: regional trade policy, technical and finan-
cial assistance and investment policy.24
Accordingly, the Cartagena Agreement conceded special treatment to
relatively less developed Andean countries such as Bolivia and Ecua-
dor.25 Differentiated treatment according to levels of development is
also established in CARICOM.2 6
As for the region, a new agreement, the Montevideo Treaty of 1980
(MT80), was signed. 27 Still in force today, it is aimed at establishing a
common market through the creation of an Area of Economic Prefer-
ences instead of by a Free Trade Area.28 More than a trade regime, the
Treaty created an association, the Latin American Integration Associa-
tion (LAIA), which gathers bilateral agreements and sub-regional sys-
tems under a single set of rules, comprising certain tariff and negotiation
aspects. By fostering the development of sub-regional groups and the
signing of bilateral or trilateral agreements among its members, the MT80
has become a legal framework, and LAIA an institutional reference, for
the regional integration process.29 Differential treatment is established as
a principle within the Treaty.30
22. See Avery & Cochrane, Subregional Integration, supra note 19, at 102; see also
Germ~nico Salgado Pefia Herrera, Viable Integration and the Economic Co-Opera-
tion Problems of the Developing World, Part I1, 19 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 175,
186 (1980); Middlebrook, supra note 17, at 65.
23. Document: Proposals for the Creation of the Latin American Common Market, 6 J.
COMMON MKT. STUD. 83, 83-110 (1966).
24. Id.; see also RAUL PREBISH ET AL., HACIA LA INTEGRACION ACELERADA DE
AMtRICA LATINA [MOVING TOWARDS AN ACCELERATED INTEGRATION IN LATIN
AMERICA] 32 (1965).
25. Middlebrook, supra note 17, at 64-65; Avery & Cochrane, Subregional Integration,
supra note 19, at 85-102.
26. See Treaty Establishing the Caribbean Community and Common Market - CAR-
ICOM, art. 3, July 4, 1973, available at http://www.sice.oas.org/trade/ccme/
ccme2.asp.
27. Treaty of Montevideo, Aug. 12, 1980, 1329 U.N.T.S. 225 [hereinafter MT80].
MT80 ceases LAFTA and establishes the Latin American Integration Association,
made up of the same eleven countries that set up or joined LAFTA. In article 5,
the Member Countries determined to charge each other lower tariffs than those
applicable to non-members. In this sense, it is a Preferential Trade Agreement.
28. See Barbosa, supra note 4, at xvi.
29. Id. at xvii; GUIDE, supra note 2, at 62-67.
30. Others such as pluralism (MT80 article 3(a)), convergence (MT80 article 3(b)),
flexibility (MT80 article 3(c)), and multiplicity (MT80 article 3(e)) were also in-
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Other arrangements, such as the Central American Common Market,
MERCOSUR, and the Group of Three, do not formally contemplate dif-
ferentiated treatment among its member countries on the basis of their
level of development. But preferential treatment is granted either
through the treatment of tariffs or considerations established in further
Protocols, as is the case in MERCOSUR (Ouro Preto 1994).31 To sum
up, the lack of differential treatment marked the end of the first regional
approach, encouraged sub-regional arrangements, and promoted the cre-
ation of a zone of economic preferences.
As advocated by ECLAC, open regionalism promotes economic inter-
dependence at the regional level through preferential integration agree-
ments. "What differentiates open regionalism from trade liberalization
and non-discriminatory export promotion is that it includes a preferential
element, which is reflected in integration agreements and reinforced by
the geographical closeness and cultural affinity of the countries of the
region." 32
ECLAC recognizes the reality of the general application of the policies
based on trade liberalization throughout the region as a consequence of
the external debt crisis. Its view today stresses that open regionalism
should take into consideration the problem of equality of opportunities
for all countries to obtain the benefits of integration. In this sense, it
proposes on the one hand a gradual and progressive tariff reduction pro-
cess to ease the adjustment of production activities in countries or sectors
considered to be less capable of competing within an enhanced market.
On the other hand, it considers the adoption of agreements on special
treatment for less developed countries. In addition, it argues that integra-
tion in some cases could be facilitated without the need for discriminatory
or special measures (i.e., avoiding severe rules of origin or including
clauses that enable the greatest number of members to accede to existing
agreements). In this manner, sustainable development, balancing eco-
nomic growth with environmental preservation, and social equity will be
achieved.33
As a consequence, countries unilaterally or through bilateral, sub-re-
gional, and regional agreements, have become more open to other mar-
kets in the region. But this openness finds Latin American countries
engaged in treaties of a different nature and scope. The variety of con-
cessions granted to members and to non-members generates great com-
plexity. It may restrain trade and bring about legal uncertainty, as
articulation and convergence have not been attained.
cluded to govern the implementation of the different clauses and the entire evolu-
tion of the regional integration process. MT80, supra note 27.
31. Latin America Economic System, THE TREATMENT OF ASYMMETRIES IN RE-
GIONAL AND SUBREGIONAL INTEGRATION PROCESS, available at http://
lanic.utexas.edu/-sela/AA2K/EN/docs/spdddi6-973.htm (last visited Oct. 5, 2005).
32. OPEN REGIONALISM, supra note 11.
33. Id.
2005]
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A. COMPLEXITY: THE DAMAGING EFFECT OF THE LATIN AMERICAN
AREA OF ECONOMIC PREFERENCES
The LAIA establishes an area of economic preferences, comprised of
three different mechanisms: (1) a regional tariff preference that member
countries reciprocally grant to each other; (2) regional scope agreements
in which all member countries participate; and (3) partial scope agree-
ments in which all member countries do not participate and that exclu-
sively bind the signatory member countries or those who may wish to
adhere to them.34
Taking into consideration the economic-structural characteristics of the
countries, and with the purpose of applying the differential treatments
foreseen in the MT80, LAIA members are considered as follows: coun-
tries at a relatively less advanced stage of economic development (Bo-
livia, Ecuador, and Paraguay); intermediate developed countries (Chile,
Colombia, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela); and other member countries
(Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico). Uruguay is "granted an exceptional
treatment more favourable than that accorded to the other intermediate
developed countries. ''35
B. MECHANISMS USED TO GRANT DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT AND
PREFERENCES AMONG THE LAIA MEMBERS
1. Regional Scope Agreements36
There are seven regional scope agreements signed by all LAIA mem-
ber countries. They are displayed in Table I section A. Article 18 of the
MT80 requires member countries to "approve negotiated lists of prefera-
ble industrial products originating from each relatively less developed
country . . . ."37 A "total elimination of customs duties and other restric-
tions [would] be accorded, without reciprocity .... "38
In compliance with this article, member countries opened their markets
to a wide range of products originating from Bolivia, Ecuador, and Para-
guay, entirely lifting customs duties and other restrictions on specific
products, beginning on April 30, 1983. These regional scope agreements
are classified by LAIA as Market-Opening Lists (AR.AM) and num-
bered AR.AM No. 1 (Bolivia), AR.AM No. 2 (Ecuador), and AR.AM
No.3 (Paraguay). 39
The fourth regional scope agreement is the Regional Tariff Preference
Agreement (AR.PAR No. 4). The Regional Tariff Preference (PAR) is
34. MT80, supra note 27, at art. 4; Wionczek, supra note 16, at 163.
35. MT80, supra note 27, at res. 6.
36. The objectives and provisions of the treaty apply to these agreements. They may
refer to the same matters and include those instruments foreseen for the partial
scope agreements. Id. at art. 6
37. Id. at art. 18.
38. Id.
39. Latin American Integration Association, Agreements, http://www.aladi.org/
nsfaladi/textacdos.nsf/textacdosingles?OpenPage&expandsection=l (last visited
Oct. 5, 2005) [hereinafter LAIA Agreements].
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established in article 5 of the MT80. PAR is determined "according to
the relative economic development of each country, in conformity with
Resolution 6 of the Council of Ministers" as described above.40 PAR ap-
plies to the entire tariff universe, except for a list of products determined
by each country. Through this general mechanism member countries
grant, on a reciprocal basis, a reduction of the rate of duties levied on
imports from third countries on the importation of products originated in
their own countries. "The current basic level of PAR is of 20 [percent]. 4 1
The other three regional scope agreements are related to scientific and
technological cooperation (Frame Agreement AR.CYT No. 6); exchange
of goods and cooperation in cultural, educational, and scientific matters
(Agreement AR.CEYC No. 7); and the Free Agreement to Trade Promo-
tion by overcoming Technical Barriers to Trade (Agreement AR.OTC
No. 8).
2. Partial Scope Agreements
The aim of these partial scope agreements (AAP)42 is to create the
conditions necessary to deepen the regional integration process by their
progressive multilateralization.4 3 They "may refer to trade, economic
complementation, agriculture, trade promotion, or adopt other modali-
ties[,]" taking into consideration, among others, "scientific and technolog-
ical cooperation, tourism promotion and preservation of the
environment."44
Partial scope agreements are governed by the following general rules:
they are open to accession to the other member countries, prior to negoti-
ation; they "contain clauses promoting convergence in order that their
benefits reach all member countries" and other Latin American coun-
tries; and they "include differential treatments depending on the three
categories of countries recognized by" the members.45
"Partial Scope Agreements among member countries have been the
instrument to consolidate and deepen their trade relations. It is the will
of the participants that determine both scope and intensity."'46 But this
mechanism led to a plethora of agreements and differential treatments
that should be consolidated by implementing the mechanisms of conver-
gence provided in the MT80. Tables I, sections B, C, and D and Table II
all contain partial scope agreements in force at the time of writing.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. MT80, supra note 27, at arts. 9-14.
43. Id. at art. 7.
44. Id. at arts. 8, 14.
45. Id. at art. 9. They may also include, among others, specific rules regarding origin,
safeguard clauses, non-tariff restrictions, withdrawal of concessions, re-negotiation
of concessions, denouncement, and coordination and harmonization of policies.
Tariff reductions may be applied to the same products or tariff sub-items and on
the basis of a percentage rebate regarding the tariffs applied to imports originating
from non-participating countries.
46. GUIDE, supra note 2, at 65.
20051
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MERCOSUR and the Andean Community are sub-regional arrange-
ments that comprise almost all LAIA members (except from Mexico and
Cuba). The LAIA members have reached several agreements aimed at
the establishment of a free trade area. Thus, the secretaries of such sub-
regional arrangements and that of the LAIA should coordinate and coop-
erate in order to consolidate all of these partial scope agreements. Each
one of them has a list of products, and each determines certain rules to
apply the preferences granted. Goods have to be identified according to
the national, sub-regional, and regional nomenclatures and compared
with the unilateral, bilateral, partial scope, sub-regional, and regional
preferences actually in force and granted by the countries in the region.
This complexity is certainly not the best incentive for entrepreneurs and
indeed creates legal uncertainty.
There are six different types of partial scope agreements: Renegoti-
ation Agreements (AA.PR), displayed in Table I, B; Commercial Agree-
ments (AAP.C), Table I, C; Agricultural (AAP.AG), Table I, D; Trade
Promotion (AAP.PC), Table I, E; Economic Complementation
(AAP.CE), Table II; and other Partial Scope Agreements, also in Table
II.
AA.PRs "compile the results of the renegotiation of the preferences
granted in past negotiations .... -147 These agreements are referred to as
the historic patrimony of the LAIA. Of the original forty agreements in
force by the end of the 1980s, only seven are currently in force.48
AAP.Cs "are strictly commercial agreements and their scope is restricted
to some productive sectors. '49 Currently there are only two commercial
agreements in force, out of a total of twenty-seven signed during the first
decade of the MT80. 50
AAP.AGs are partial scope agreements negotiated under article 12 of
the MT80, and are aimed at promoting and regulating intra-regional
trade of agricultural and livestock products. They should take into ac-
count the participating countries' socio-economic characteristics of pro-
duction, establishing flexible mechanisms. "These agreements may refer
to specific products or groups of products, and may be based on tempo-
rary, seasonal, per quota or mixed concessions, or on contracts between
State or para-State organizations. ' 51 AAP.PCs "refer to non-tariff mat-
ters and tend to promote intrarregional [sic] trade flows."15 2
The following table shows all Regional Scope agreements actually in
force and the four forms of regional scope agreements described above
(i.e., AA.PR, AAP.C, AAP.AG, and AAP.PC).




51. MT80, supra note 27, at art. 12.
52. Id. at art. 13.
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The remaining partial scope agreements are the Economic Comple-
mentation Agreements and other modalities of the partial scope agree-
ments. They are contained in Table II. "Economic complementation
agreements [AAP.CE] are aimed, among other objectives, to promote
maximum utilization of production factors, stimulate economic comple-
mentation, ensure equitable conditions for competition, facilitate entry of
products into the international market, and encourage the balanced and
harmonious development of member countries. '54
Besides the sub-regional schemes of integration (the Andean Commu-
nity and MERCOSUR), there are nine agreements of economic comple-
mentation that determine the creation of free trade areas among
signatories. These are Chile-Venezuela (AAP.CE No. 23 FIA 1993),
Chile-Colombia (AAP.CE No. 24 FTA 1993), Bolivia-Mexico (AAP.CE
No. 31 FTA 1994), Chile-Ecuador (AAP.CE No. 32 FTA 1994), Colom-
bia-Mexico-Venezuela, the Group of Tree (AAP.CE No. 33 FTA (G-3)
1994), MERCOSUR-Chile (AAP.CE No. 35 FTA-MS 1994),
MERCOSUR-Bolivia (AAP.CE No. 36 FTA-MS 1996), Chile-Peru
(AAP.CE No. 38 FTA 1998) and Chile-Mexico (AAP.CE No. 41 FTA
1998). 55
There are other economic complementation agreements.
MERCOSUR-Mexico (AAP.CE No. 54 FTA-MS-m 2002) establishes the
framework for a free trade area. The Andean Community and
MERCOSUR signed a partial scope agreement under article 14 MT80
(AAP.A14TM/11 F-FTA 1998). It is aimed at establishing the frame for
a future free trade area. Through several economic complementation
agreements, these two sub-regional agreements have been building up an
important South American bloc (AAP.CE No. 48 tFTA-MS 2000,
AAP.CE No. 56 tFTA-MS 2002, and the recent AAP.CE No. 59 tFTA-
MS 2003).
Other modalities of partial scope agreements are established under ar-
ticle 14 of the MT80. They "regulate specific matters concerning tariff
preferences .... -56 It may require cooperation actions aimed at "creat-
ing favourable conditions for the exchange of goods and services, such as
transport and tourism, for the protection of the environment, the optimal
use of road infrastructure, [or] the overcoming of technical barriers to
trade . . . 57
54. MT80, supra note 27, at art. 11.
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OPEN REGIONALISM IN LATIN AMERICA
Table III shows nineteen partial scope agreements actually in force
(AAP.A25 TM) that some LAIA member countries signed with other
Latin American non-member countries and areas of integration. 59 Ac-
cording to article 19 of MT80, the preferences granted in these agree-
ments are automatically extended to the countries of relatively less
economic development within the LAIA.6°
59. MT80, supra note 27, at art. 25.
60. Id. at art. 19.
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OPEN REGIONALISM IN LATIN AMERICA
Finally, to further illustrate the complexity generated by the integration
euphoria of the 1990s, the Inter American Development Bank (IDB) cre-
ated this graphic, which they call the spaghetti bowl of Latin American
Regional Integration.62 It only takes into account trade agreements
signed and under negotiation in the Americas. It does not consider the
bulk of the regional or partial scope agreements signed under the LAIA's
framework referred to in the last sections and compiled in Tables I, II,
and III.
Figure 1. The IDB's Spaghetti Bowl of Latin American
Regional Integration 63
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Overall, differential treatment and economic preferences certainly
mean complexity. They are important tools for economic development
and integration. Notwithstanding their importance, the lack of conver-
gence among this kaleidoscope of obligations and preferences makes it
62. ANTONI ESTEVADEORDAL, REGIONAL INTEGRATION AND REGIONAL CO-OPERA-
TION IN LATIN AMERICA 29-30 (Asian Development Bank, 2002), http://www.adb.
org/documents/events/2002/trade-policy/NRA-pres.pdf; Inter-American Develop-
ment Bank, The New Regionalism, 19 LATIN AM. ECON. POLICIES 1, at 1, 5 (2002),
http://www.iadb.org/res/publications/pubfiles/pubN-19E.pdf; INTER-AMERICAN
DEVELOPMENT BANK, BEYOND BORDERS: THE NEW REGIONALISM IN LATIN
AMERICA 64 (2002), available at http://www.iadb.org/res/publications/pubfiles/
pubB-2002E_8462.pdf.
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difficult for the actors of integration to fully understand their implications
and scope.
3. Politically Led Process
Open regionalism is also based on ECLAC's view that "unilateral, re-
gional and multilateral liberalization processes can all build upon one an-
other provided that Governments have a clear picture of the interests at
stake." 64 The construction of building blocks for a more open and trans-
parent international economy necessarily requires the leadership of the
governments.
The Latin American integration processes also rely on the political will
of the local governments. Regional integration is formally reached
through international conventions signed by the heads of state of the par-
ticipating countries. The institutions created in order to implement what
has been agreed upon depend entirely on the will of local governments.
Latin American constitutions present a tendency towards what is called
Presidencialismo, defined as the inclination to grant enormous powers to
the presidents of the nations and to require little accountability. This pro-
pensity was very strong within Latin American democracies during the
1970s and 1980s. During this period military dictatorships also appeared
in the region. The propensity started to decrease, however, in the 1990s
but tended to reappear from time to time (i.e., Peru under Fujimori and
Venezuela under Chavez Frias).
As for integration, governments lead or undermine the process accord-
ing to their ideological tendencies and the pressures of the local interest
groups. This happens due to the actual structure of the different sub-
regional and regional schemes. Even in cases where there is a governing
supranational law, on occasion governments still find it difficult to comply
when political circumstances force them to make determinations that pro-
tect local interest to the detriment of those of the sub-region. As a conse-
quence, they relax the scope of their commitments and tend to defy the
sanctity of the decisions of the supranational bodies, in accordance with
their national concerns.
LAFTA, for instance, faced serious obstacles in this regard, such as the
instability and heterogeneity of political regimes (military dictatorships in
Argentina, Uruguay, and Chile, as well as Brazil) and conflicts between
members (Ecuador and Peru) struck the region during the 1960s and
1970s. Ruptures and distancing were the result of episodes of authoritari-
anism within the region. 65 At that time, changes in governments meant
changes in the policies towards sub-regional or regional integration. 66
64. Secretariat of ECLAC, Globalization and Regionalization: A View from Latin
America and the Caribbean, 58 CAPITULOS DEL SELA 51,63-64 (2000) (discuss-
ing the implications of open regionalism to the governments within of the region).
65. GUIDE, supra note 2, at 3.
66. Rita Giacalone, La Integraci6n Regional en la Historia [Regional Integration in
History], http://www.comunidadandina.org/bda/docs/VE-INT-0003.pdf (last visited
Oct. 5, 2005).
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As for the Andean process of integration, Andean presidents have
played an important role. The leadership of the Andean presidents has
moved the Andean scheme forward in times of crisis or has detained it
when external shocks, lack of understanding, or the protection of domes-
tic interests made it necessary. 67 Their involvement has been core in
shaping and reshaping the sub-regional scheme. Conversely, the strong
politicization of the Andean bodies was considered one of the causes of
its failure at the end of the 1970s. 68 Apart from the different political
structures of the members, which became a problem after 1973, govern-
ments disrupted the methods of distributing costs and benefits within the
bodies of the Andean Pact.69 By taking advantage of the weakness of its
structure and the lack of supranational authority, the manifestation of the
political will of the parties was needed in each instance of the process. 70
Due to the remaining politicization of the actual Andean bodies and insti-
tutions, the Andean Integration System is highly vulnerable to external
shocks such us political changes and misunderstanding among member
countries.
Overall, regional integration in Latin America can be regarded as a
mere action driven by the governments and the institutions established
through the integration treaties. In many ways, it has been a top-down
process that, until recently, had not taken into account the private actors
within the local economies.71
ECLAC's hopes for a coordinated and articulated function of the over-
all regional integration process are far from attained. Particularly during
the last five years, the simultaneous negotiations within sub-regional, re-
gional, hemispheric, and multilateral forums have placed considerable de-
mands on the Latin American countries.
The general impression that emerges is one of governments that are
not ready to understand the complexity of the web of treaties created
during the last decade, or their implications. They do not have a coherent
game plan to defend their local interests, let alone those of the sub-re-
gions and the region as a whole. This is worsened by the natural tendency
of politicians to assess social and economic phenomena with a short-
sighted vision and shallow approach. As a result, it is more difficult to
find a comprehensive and thorough solution to the challenges of integra-
tion in the context of globalization.
In addition, governments in the region and in the sub-regions (prima-
rily within the Andean Community) do not share the same visions and
interests. As the process has taken more than a decade, its continuity has
been affected by the changes in the heads of state and their respective
67. Rafael Vargas-Hidalgo, The Crisis of the Andean Pact: Lessons for Integration




71. Giacalone, supra note 66; see also Avery & Cochrane, Subregional Integration,
supra note 19, at 88-89.
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international policies. The economic crises still striking the region have
weakened the quality and ability of the negotiators, and have left the in-
stitutions (i.e., the Latin America Economic System (SELA), the LAIA,
and the Sub-regional Secretariats) with limited technical and financial re-
sources in charge of coordinating integration.
IV. HIGHLY INSTITUTIONALIZED
STRUCTURES AND FORUMS
Open regionalism advocates the construction of building blocks aimed
at procuring a balanced immersion within the global economy. Conse-
quently, ECLAC's approach poses the challenge of balancing the forces
and local interests towards regional integration and global economic im-
mersion.72 Following Tussie, open regionalism seems to be conducive to
more effective multilateralism. 73 An adequate response to this undertak-
ing implies a certain degree of institutionalism.
The following section introduces both the institutional structures of the
six integration schemes in Latin America and the Caribbean, and the
group of institutions and bodies created with the aim of coordinating and
cooperating with the processes of economic integration. After a decade
of open regionalism these organs and bodies present a high degree of
institutional fatigue, duplicity of functions, lack of identity, and shortfall
of resources. Unless these institutions are rearranged and modernized,
the immersion of the region as a bloc in the global economy will face
serious difficulties.
A. INSTITUTIONAL STRUCrURES
South-South Regional Integration in Latin America has produced a
complex web of institutions and bodies entrusted with different tasks and
responsibilities within the region and the sub-regions. The following is a
summarized review of the different institutions acting within the structure
of the six schemes currently in place, including Central America and the
Caribbean. It takes into consideration the major bodies with political and
executive leadership. Equally, it considers the technical bodies or secre-
tariats. It does not, however, refer to jurisdictional, parliamentary, or
consultative bodies and financial institutions, which are present in almost
all arrangements.
At the end of this section there are two tables that help to correlate
and explain, at a glance, the density of the several bodies, organs, and
72. Carlos Moneta, More Than Ever World Reality Requires Coordination and Coop-
eration Between SELA Member States, 57 CAPITULOS DEL SELA 117, 117-19
(1999); see also Inter-American Development Bank, Topics, Integration & Trade,
http://www.iadb.org/topics/in.cfm (last visited Oct. 5, 2005).
73. "A new multilateralism can emerge from the regional units with countries having a
first direct say at the regional rather than multilateral level, as they do now, where
power asymmetries are wide and affinities limited." Diana Tussie, Multilateral-
ism's New Approach in the Global Economy, 53 CAPITULOS DEL SELA 29, 43,
45 (1998).
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institutions actually in place. Table IV(A) contains the institutions re-
ferred to in this section. Table IV(B) includes those that are not.
Vacchino and Noto compiled the information and prepared these two ta-
bles for the Permanent Secretariat of SELA.74
1. Latin American Integration Association
The LAIA has a flexible and relatively small institutional organization
in comparison to the sub-regional schemes. It is established in chapter VI
(articles 28-42) of the MT80. The political bodies of the LAIA75 are: (1)
the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs acting as the supreme body of
the LAIA, comprised of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the member
countries; 76 (2) the Evaluation and Convergence Conference composed
of Plenipotentiaries of member countries;77 and (3) the Committee of
Representatives, which is the permanent body of the LAIA. 78 The tech-
nical body of the LAIA is the General Secretariat.79
2. Central American Integration System
The Tegucigalpa Protocol created the Central American Integration
System (SICA) in 1991.80 The governments of Guatemala, El Salvador,
Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and Panama compose the SICA.81 Be-
lize joined in 2000.82 The SICA contains the following organs: the Presi-
dential Meeting, as the supreme body of the System;83 the Council of
Ministers (the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs acting as an organ
for coordination and direction); 84 the Executive Committee; 85 and the
General Secretariat. 86
3. Central American Common Market
The General Treaty on Central American Economic Integration be-
tween Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua was signed in
74. The Permanent Secretariat of SELA incorporated these tables into its Proposals
for a Regional Integration Articulation and Convergence Program, 67
CAPITULOS DEL SELA (2003).
75. MT80, supra note 27, at art. 28.
76. Id. at arts. 30-32, 43. The Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs shall adopt
whatever decisions may correspond to the higher governing policy of the economic
integration process. Its powers are described in article 30.
77. Id. at arts. 33-34, 43. Its powers are established in article 33.
78. Id. at arts. 35-37, 43. Its powers and duties are determined in article 35.
79. Id. at arts. 29, 38-41.
80. Tegucigalpa Protocol to the Charter of the Organization of Central American
States, Dec. 13, 1991, available at http://www.sgsica.org/sica/documentos/prototegu.
pdf.
81. Id. at art. 1.
82. Id. at Instrument of Accession.
83. Id. at arts. 12-15. Article 15 defines the activities and scope of the Meeting.
84. Id. at arts. 16-23.
85. Id. at arts. 23, 24.
86. Tegucigalpa Protocol, supra note 80, at arts. 23, 25-28.
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1960.87 Costa Rica joined later in 1962.88 The organs and bodies of the
Treaty are established in chapter IX (articles XX-XXIV). "The Central
American Economic Council [is] composed of the Ministers of Economic
Affairs of the several Contracting Parties ... ."89 The Executive Council,
consisting of one titular official appointed by each Contracting Party, was
established "[f]or the purpose of applying and administering the present
Treaty and of undertaking all the negotiations and work designed to give
practical effect to the Central American Economic union.. . ."9 A Per-
manent Secretariat was also instituted. 91
4. The Caribbean Community and Common Market
The revised Treaty of Chaguaramas established the Caribbean Com-
munity, including the common market.92 It was signed by Barbados, Ja-
maica, Guyana, and Trinidad and Tobago, and came into effect on August
1, 1973. 93 Another eleven Caribbean territories joined later.94 Although
the Bahamas became the thirteenth Member State of the Community on
July 4, 1983, it is not a member of the Common Market.95
The principal organs of the Community 96 are the Conference of Heads
of Government acting as the supreme organ of the Community,97 and the
Community Council of Ministers. 98 The councils for Finance and Plan-
ning,99 Trade and Economic Development, m° Foreign and Community
Relations,l 0mand Human and Social Development 0 2 all assist the princi-
pal organs. The Secretariat is the principal administrative organ of the
Community. 103
5. The Andean Community
The 1996 Trujillo Procotol introduced changes to the 1969 Cartagena
87. General Treaty on Central American Economic Integration, Annex I, Dec. 13,
1960, U.N. Doc. E/CN.12/552.
88. Id. at Accession of Costa Rica.
89. Id. at art. XX. Its main purpose is to integrate the Central American economies
and coordinate the economic policy of the Contracting States.
90. Id. at arts. XXI-XXII.
91. Id. at arts. XXIII-XXIV.
92. Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas Establishing the Caribbean Community Including
the CARICOM Single Market and Economy, 2001, available at, http://www.car-
icom.org/jsp/community/revised-treaty-text.pdf [hereinafter Chaguaramas Treaty].
93. Id.
94. CARICOM, Caribbean Community (CARICOM) Secretariat, Members, http://
www.caricom.org/jsp/community/member-states.jsp?menu=community (last vis-
ited Oct. 5, 2005).
95. See id.
96. See Chaguaramas Treaty, supra note 92, at art. 10.
97. Id. at art. 11. Powers and functions of the Conference are established in article 12
98. Id. at art. 13.
99. Id. at art. 14.
100. Id. at art. 15.
101. Id. at art. 16.
102. See Chaguaramas Treaty, supra note 92, at art. 17.
103. Id. at arts. 23-25
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Agreement.1°4 This Protocol created the Andean Community, and estab-
lished the Andean Integration System to promote effective coordination
between its component bodies and institutions.
"The Andean Presidential Council is the highest-level body ... made
up of the Heads of State of the Member Countries... .,1o5 The Andean
Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs is the political leadership body,
comprised of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Member Coun-
tries.106 The Andean Community Commission is the main policy-making
body, encompassing a plenipotentiary representative from the govern-
ments of each of the Member Countries. 10 7 The General Secretariat of
the Andean Community is the executive body of the system.108
6. The Common Market of the South
The 1994 Protocol of Ouro Preto modified the 1991 Treaty of Asuncion
and established the structure of Mercosur. 10 9 The highest organ is the
Council of the Common Market.110 It involves the "Ministers for Foreign
Affairs and the Ministers of the Economy of the States Parties, or their
equivalents." ' "The Common Market Group is the executive organ,"
' 2
consisting of four members "who must include representatives of the
Ministries of Foreign Affairs, the Ministries of the Economy (or their
equivalents) and the Central Banks."113 The Mercosur Trade Commis-
sion is responsible for assisting the Common Market Group.114 It pro-
vides support by monitoring the "application of the common trade policy
instruments agreed by the States Parties in connection with the operation
of the customs union .... ",1 5 It also follows up and reviews questions and
"issues relating to common trade policies, intra-Mercosur trade[,] and
[trade with] third countries.11 6 These three are inter-governmental or-
gans with decision-making powers.' 1 7
"The Joint Parliamentary Commission is the organ representing the
parliaments of the States Parties within Mercosur."118 The Economic-
Social Consultative Forum represents the economic and social sectors.119
104. Andean Subregional Integration Agreement (Cartagena Agreement), May 26,
1969, as amended, art. 6, available at http://www.comunidadandina.org/ingles/trea-
ties/trea/andetriel.
105. Id. at arts. 11-14.
106. Id. at arts. 15-20.
107. Id. at arts. 21-28.
108. Id. at arts. 29-39.
109. Protocol of Ouro Preto, Dec. 17, 1994, art. 1, available at http://www.sice.oas.org/
trade/mrcsr/ourop/ourop-e.asp.
110. Id. at art. 3.
111. Id. at arts. 3-9.
112. Id. at art. 10.
113. Id. at art. 11.
114. Id. at art. 16.
115. Protocol of Ouro Preto, supra note 109, at art. 16.
116. Id.
117. Id. at art. 2.
118. Id. at art. 22.
119. Id. at arts. 28-30.
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The Mercosur Administrative Secretariat provides administrative sup-
port. 120 These three institutions are also part of the institutional structure
of Mercosur. 21
As shown in Table IV(A), all six major bodies with political, executive,
or technical leadership in the six regional or sub-regional arrangements
have a major, if not total, dependency on the governments of each coun-
try member. The Ministers of Foreign Affairs are entrusted with impor-
tant powers and duties. Civil society and private entrepreneurs take little
part in the processes.
120. Id. at arts. 31-33.
121. Protocol of Ouro Preto, supra note 109, at art. 1.
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OPEN REGIONALISM IN LATIN AMERICA
B. INSTITUTIONS CREATED OR ACTING WITH THE AIM OF
PROMOTING ARTICULATION, COORDINATION, COOPERATION,
AND CONVERGENCE WITHIN THE REGION
Parallel to the structures, institutions, bodies, and organs which com-
prise the different schemes, organizations already in place, such as the
LAIA and the ECLAC, have been entrusted or established with the aim
of promoting articulation, coordination, cooperation, and convergence in
the region. Some of them have technical purposes. Others are political
arrangements. All in all, and due to the increasing tendency to negotiate
and establish North-South agreements, some of these South-South insti-
tutions seem to be losing their identity and function.
1. Latin American Integration Association
According to its nature, the LAIA is an institution created to promote
cooperation and convergence. The kaleidoscope of regional scope agree-
ments, partial scope agreements, renegotiation agreements, commercial,
agricultural, trade promotion, and agreements with non-members, con-
sidered above, is the consequence of the intense activity of its member
countries.
As stated before, article three of the MT80 establishes, among others,
the principle of convergence upon which member countries would obtain
a progressive multilateralization of the various partial scope agreements
by means of periodical negotiations. In this sense it is clear that if, under
the LAIA's framework, a complex web of concessions and obligations
were created, the Treaty provides for its convergence. Therefore, the
LAIA is called to promote this process through the activities and powers
of the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs and the Evaluation and
Convergence Conference. As already pointed out above, the Ministers of
Foreign Affairs have a place and important responsibilities not only
within the LAIA, but also in other sub-regional arrangements such as the
Andean Community or MERCOSUR-member countries that form part
of the Association. This circumstance should create the conditions for
articulation, cooperation, and coordination. But important work still
needs to be carried out in this regard.
2. United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the
Caribbean
When considering not only the early stages but also the complete pro-
cess of regional integration in Latin America, it is essential to refer to the
comprehensive, influential and, in some cases, the criticized work of
ECLAC.123 ECLAC "is one of the five regional commissions of the
123. The United Nations Economic and Social Council through Resolution 106 (VI),
dated February 25, 1948, originally established it. Caribbean countries were in-
cluded later on by Resolution 1984/67, dated July 27, 1984, changing its name to
the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). For
more information on the ECLAC see ECLAC, About ECLAC: The Institution,
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United Nations. '1 24 The Commission "was founded for the purposes of
contributing to the economic development of Latin America, coordinat-
ing actions directed towards this end, and reinforcing economic relation-
ships among the countries and with the other nations of the world. '125
"The promotion of the region's social development was later included
among its primary objectives. 126
ECLAC, as a United Nations institution, is independent from all re-
gional and sub-regional arrangements. It still plays a key role in the re-
gion, not only by providing assistance and meaningful research, but also
by proposing policies aimed at gaining sustainable and balanced develop-
ment for the Latin American countries.
3. The Latin American Economic System
In 1975, the heads of state present at the Panama Convention consid-
ered it "imperative to promote greater unity among Latin American
countries . "...1,127 They found it essential to carry out concerted actions
in the field of intra-regional economic and social cooperation. At the
same time, it was considered fundamental to "increase the bargaining
power of the region and to ensure that Latin America occupie[d] its right-
ful position in the international community. '12 8
To that end, they established SELA as a "permanent regional body for
consultation, coordination, cooperation and joint economic and social
promotion .... ,"129 SELA has two fundamental purposes: (1) to promote
intra-regional cooperation in order to accelerate the economic and social
development of its members and (2) to provide a permanent system of
consultation and coordination for the adoption of common positions and
strategies on economic and social matters in international bodies and fo-
rums as well as before third countries and groups of countries.1 30
This institution provides important research and is a core forum for
discussion among its members. CAPITULOS is a serious publication
that offers meaningful contributions to scholars and the public in general.
But as a consequence of the establishment of additional forums such as
the Group of Rio, its influence in the region has been undermined.13'
http://www.eclac.org (last visited Oct. 5, 2005); see also Balassa, Regional Integra-
tion, supra 10, at 59-60.
124. ECLAC, supra note 123.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Panama Convention Establishing the Latin American Economic System (SELA),
Aug. 2, 1975, available at http://www.sela.orglpublichtml/AA2K/EN/docs/
panconv.htm.
128. Id.
129. Id. at art. 2.
130. Id. at art. 3.
131. SEBASTIAN ALLEGRETr, Is THE CRISIS IN SELA OR IN LATIN AMERICA? (2002),
available at http://www.sela.org/publichtml/AA2K2/ESP/libros/librosl.htm.
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C. ASSOCIATION OF CARIBBEAN STATES
The Convention Establishing the Association of Caribbean States
(ACS) was signed on July 24, 1994 in Cartagena de Indias, Colombia,
with the aim of promoting consultation, cooperation, and concerted ac-
tion among all the countries of the Caribbean. 132 It comprises twenty-
five member States as follows: Antigua and Bermuda, Bahamas, Barba-
dos, Belize, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Repub-
lic, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica,
Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent
and the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, and Venezuela.1 33
There are also two associate members: the Kingdom of the Netherlands
(on behalf of Aruba), and France (on behalf of French Guiana, Guade-
loupe, and Martinique). Eight other non-independent Caribbean coun-
tries are eligible for associate membership.134
Among other activities, the Association promotes
gradually and progressively among its members . . . (a) economic
integration, including the liberali[z]ation of trade, investment, trans-
portation and other related areas; (b) discussion on matters of com-
mon interest for the purpose of facilitating active and coordinated
participation by the region in the various multilateral fora; . . .(f)
consultation, cooperation and concerted action in such other areas as
may be agreed upon. 135
D. Rio GROUP
The Rio Group, created in 1986, is the Permanent Mechanism of Politi-
cal Consultation and Coordination. 136 The members of this group are
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Re-
public, Honduras, Ecuador, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru,
Uruguay, Venezuela, and Guyana, on behalf of CARICOM. 137 The
Mechanism is "the result of the fusion of the Contadora Group (Mexico,
Colombia, Venezuela and Panama) and the Support Group (Argentina,
Brazil, Uruguay and Peru), which met previously to analyze and propose
solutions to the political crises in Central America. 1'' 38
The Declaration of Rio de Janeiro (1986) established the main objec-
tives of the Group, as follows: (1) to expand and systematize political
cooperation among the member states; (2) to examine international is-
sues that may be of interest and coordinate common positions on these
132. Convention Establishing the Association of Caribbean States, art. III, July 24,
1994, available at http://www.acs-aec.org/convention.htm.
133. Id. at annex 1.
134. Id. at annex 11.
135. Id. at art. III, sec. 2.
136. For more information on the Rio Group see Brazil Ministry of External Relations,
The Rio Group, http://www.mre.gov.br/ingles/politica-externa/grupos/grupo-rio/
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issues.; (3) to promote more efficient operation and coordination of Latin
American cooperation and integration organizations; (4) to present ap-
propriate solutions to the problems and conflicts affecting the region; (5)
to provide momentum, through dialogue and cooperation, to the initia-
tives and actions undertaken to improve inter-American relations; and
(6) to explore jointly new fields of cooperation that enhance economic,
social, scientific, and technological development. 139
In March 1999, member countries signed the Veracruz Act, assessing,
among other issues, those related to regional institutionalism and re-
gional integration. 140
In relation to regional institutionalism, the heads of state pointed out
the need for enhancing efficiency, avoiding duplication of efforts and pro-
curing effective use of the resources available.14' Due to the new per-
spectives regarding hemispheric integration, they considered it important
to strengthen cooperation and coordination mechanisms, aiming at ratio-
nalizing the functioning of the different regional organisms. 142
The Rio Group is also conducive to harmonious development, and con-
siders regional integration as a core political commitment and supports
all integration processes of regional, sub-regional, multilateral, and bilat-
eral scope, based upon the principle of open regionalism. 143
Table V relates all countries which compose Central America, the Car-
ibbean, and South America to the regional or sub-regional South-South
agreements to which they belong, such as LAIA, MERCOSUR, the An-
dean Community, SICA, the Central American Common Market, and
CARICOM. At the same time, it features the institutions set up and
aimed at coordinating and cooperating in regional or sub-regional eco-
nomic integration. To that end, it first displays technical institutions such
as ECLAC and SELA. Third, it shows the political organizations created
with the purpose of enhancing cooperation and coordination among the
countries in the region, such as the ACS and the Rio Group.
The effect of this tendency towards setting up heavy institutionalized
schemes is two-fold. On the one hand, the propensity towards crowded
internal structures present among the various arrangements creates bu-
reaucracy and does not allow enough room for convergence. On the
other hand, governments seek other forums different from those already
created within the regions or sub-regions, thus duplicating efforts and in-
efficiently using resources.
It is argued that Latin American South-South regional integration has
been a politically led process. All major schemes have been either af-
fected by the lack of commitment of the governments involved or
139. Id.
140. Find more information on the Veracruz summit at http://
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boosted in periods of integration euphoria. As can be derived from the
different institutional structures, the leadership of the different processes
has been placed on the Presidents or the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of
the member countries. In this sense, articulation, convergence, coopera-
tion, and coordination should come from the governments, as it has been
a top-down process.
The lack of a clear, concerted, and committed external policy among
the governments of the region and within the sub-regional arrangements
constitutes one of the main causes of the dysfunctional operation of their
institutional networks.
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V. ANTITHETIC POLICIES AND POSITIONS
TOWARDS EXTERNAL MARKETS
A. FROM IMPORT-SUBSTITUTION POLICIES TO NEO-LIBERAL
POLICIES AND STILL FRAGILE
ECLAC's definition sustains that open regionalism promotes economic
interdependence at the regional level through various policies in a con-
text of liberalization and deregulation, geared towards enhancing the
competitiveness of the countries of the region. The early regional inte-
gration and sub-regional attempts (i.e., LAFTA and the Andean Pact)
were conducted within the framework of the import substitution industri-
alization policy.1 45 By impeding manufactured imports through the es-
tablishment of high tariffs on them, it was expected that member
countries would develop their own industries, thereby reducing their de-
pendency on industrialized countries. 146 Production sharing arrange-
ments were also put in place, dividing the production process across the
region.1 47 As local markets became too small for the production, re-
gional integration was required in order to allow for economies of scale,
creating larger markets for regionally manufactured products. 148
Notwithstanding the import substitution model, countries continued to
rely on exports of primary products. 149 Even though the composition of
imports changed, the quantity as a whole did not diminish.1 50 At the
same time, the industrialization process was based on strongly protected
national markets that generated interest groups in national economies
opposed to opening up the local markets to other countries in the re-
gion. 151 As a result, countries started to present imbalances in the exter-
nal sector that were resolved through external financing.1 52 The
availability of Euro Dollars, as a consequence of the boom in the oil in-
dustry in the 1970s, triggered unprecedented external borrowing from
Latin American countries. It negatively affected the whole region when
policies of developed countries changed in order to control their internal
145. This policy was based on ECLAC's model. At that time, it argued consistently that
Latin American countries were peripheral to the more industrialized economies,
which were considered the centre. To transform this relationship, Latin American
economies must develop industrialization programs led by the United States in
order to limit their role as mere exporters of raw materials to the centre. By tem-
porally introducing tariffs, selectively and moderately to those elaborated goods
produced by the countries in the centre, industrialization through import substitu-
tion would achieve economic development. See GUIDE, supra note 2, at 6-7; see
also F.A.G. Keesing & P.J. Brand, Possible Role of a Clearing House in the Latin
American Regional Market 10 IMF Staff Papers 390, 411-13 (1963).
146. See Hufbauer & Kotschwar, supra note 11.
147. Id.
148. Id.
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inflation. 153 The increasingly onerous financial conditions forced the
countries to create surpluses in order to service the external debt by con-
tracting imports, therefore closing their markets to other countries.' 54
These international economic factors, as well as the first petroleum cri-
sis in 1978 and the increasing external debt of the Latin American coun-
tries, made the economies of the region more dependent on international
markets. This escalating reliance on external funding and the consequent
external debt crisis of the 1980s changed the attitudes of these countries
towards regional integration.155
On August 20, 1982, Mexico announced the unilateral suspension of
principal payments on its foreign debt. Then, the external debt crisis
started. International lenders immediately issued new loans and resched-
uled the private sector's current obligations and official debts .156
The rescheduling of official debt was managed through the so-called
Paris Club, t 57 which usually required the acceptance of an International
Monetary Fund (IMF) structural adjustment program before reschedul-
ing. The same was applied to the rescheduling of commercial debt. The
IMF started to play a supervisory role, conditioning its loans both on the
commitment of new funds from commercial banks and on the economic
policy reform of the debtors. 158
The IMF reform programs1 59 were aimed at generating enough re-
sources to allow debtors to pay back international loans. Apart from re-
ducing the size and role of local governments, IMF structural adjustments
were also focused on curtailing protectionism, in contrast to the Washing-
ton consensus by which "economic growth is promoted through unilateral
tariff cuts and reduction in import restrictions."'160
The structural reforms implemented were based on policies that
clashed with those supporting the regional and sub-regional integration
schemes in place at that time, and induced a general non-compliance with
153. See ECLAC, MARCO HISTORICO DE LA INTEGRACION LATINO AMERICANA [His-
TORIC FRAMEWORK OF THE LATIN AMERICAN INTEGRATION], available at http://
www.eclac.cl/publicaciones/Comercio/0/lcr1820/capi.htm (last visited Oct. 5, 2005).
154. GUIDE, supra note 2, at 8.
155. Barbosa, supra note 4, at xiv.
156. Ross P. BUCKLEY, 8 EMERGING MARKETS DEBT: AN ANALYSIS OF THE SECON-
DARY MARKET 29-44 (1999).
157. Id. It meets any time a rescheduling of official debt is needed. As its members are
the major creditors of the requesting nation, it has no fixed members, no office,
and no administrative bodies. Id. at 30
158. Id. at 31.
159. According to Buckley, policies proposed included:
" reductions in the budget deficit to limit inflation, local interest rates and the
need for foreign borrowing;
" limits on domestic credit expansion to control inflation;
* exchange rate devaluations to discourage imports and encourage exports; and
" limits on borrowing consistent with the debtor's capacity to pay.
Other structural adjustment[s]... included (i) higher income and sales taxes, (ii) higher
charges for state-produced goods and services such as electricity and water, (iii) pri-
vate[zlation of state-owned companies, (iv) deregulation of the labour market, and (v)
reform of tariffs and import quota regimes. Id. at 32
160. Id.
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the sub-regional or bilateral obligations. 61 For some commentators, the
eighties constituted the lost decade for integration. 162 As the sub-re-
gional integration effort seemed meaningless, member countries opted
for a pragmatic approach, easing the obligations for which they had origi-
nally contracted. 163
The end of the Cold War in 1989 brought fears within the region that
international capital flows might be allocated in the former Soviet coun-
tries. Therefore, it was essential for all Latin American economies to par-
ticipate and be competitive in the world economy. 164 Neo-liberal policies
introduced in the domestic context geared up to the opening of the Latin
American markets,165 eliminating the anti-exportation bias inherent to
the inward-oriented industrial development strategies. 166
The lost decade of the 1980s, instead of ending the ongoing process of
regional and sub-regional integration, encouraged it under new policies
that promoted the opening of the markets to foreign trade. The resultant
need to do so invigorated integration schemes during the 1990s.
This new regionalism167 is based upon a different policy framework
that promotes open and competitive private market-based economies
within a democratic institutional setting. It involves the following
premises:
Deepening grade liberalisation and lock-in reforms, market driven
and attraction of foreign direct investment, creating and diversifying
trade and dynamic productive transformation, geopolitics, institu-
tional modernisation and enhanced regional co-operation. At the
same time, it applies simple liberalisation programs, irreversible
commitments, GATT/WTO rules of liberalisation, it is highly recip-
rocal and uses automatic schedules to liberalise trade with limited
161. A report by the Board of the Cartagena Agreement at that time points out that
[tioday the Andean Group is being subjected to adverse forces that signifi-
cantly hold back its progress and seriously jeopardize the community struc-
tures built with so much effort. Currently there are problems in the field of
trade liberalization, difficulties that prevent the industrialization programmes
from being implemented, lack of definition on issues like the common exter-
nal tariff[,] and many instances where the commitments made in the field of
legal regulations have not been fulfilled.
SELA, LATIN AMERICA AND CARIBBEAN INTEGRATION SCHEMES IN THE FACE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRISIS (1999), available at http://lanic.utexas.edu/-sela/AA2K/EN/docs/
spclxxvdi9-2.htm (last visited Oct. 5, 2005).
162. Id.; see also Barbosa, supra note 4, at xviii.
163. GUIDE, supra note 2, at 45; see also Barbosa, supra note 4, at xi-xii.
164. GUIDE, supra note 2, at 8-9; see also Bela Balassa, The Process of Industrial Devel-
opment and Alternative Development Strategies, in 141 EssAYs IN INTERNATIONAL
FINANCE, 6-12 (1980).
165. Barbosa, supra note 4, at xviii; see also GUIDE, supra note 2, at 45; RENATO BAU-
MANN ET AL., Los PROCESOS DE INTEGRACION DE LOS PASES DE AMP-RICA LA-
TINA Y EL CARIBE 2000-2001: AVANCES, RETROCESOS v TEMAS PENDIENTES [THE
PROCESSES OF INTEGRATION OF THE LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN COUN-
TRIES 2000-2001: GAINS, DRAWBACKS AND ISSUES TO DEFINE] 30-31 (2002), avail-
able at http://www.sice.oas.org/geograph/westernh/eclac02.pdf.
166. See OPEN REGIONALISM, supra note 11.
167. See Devlin & Estevadeordal, New Regionalism, supra note 17.
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negative lists.1 68
As countries in the region shared the same market-oriented economic
policies, "the impact of concessions given to each other was not very dif-
ferent from the concessions given to third countries." 169 Consequently,
bilateral and trilateral arrangements appeared, as did several preferential
trading arrangements.1 70 As referenced above, the partial scope agree-
ments provided for in the MT80 brought about MERCOSUR. 171 Recip-
rocal free trade areas were negotiated mainly by Chile and among sub-
regional schemes. The establishment of the Treaty on Free Trade be-
tween Colombia, Mexico, and Venezuela is another example.1 72 It al-
lowed the establishment of North-South agreements such as the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFfA) and the consequent Free
Trade Agreement signed by the United States and Chile. 173 Further-
more, South-South agreements started to shake as a consequence of the
negotiations towards the establishment of the Free Trade Area of the
Americas.
The inward-looking model, which tried to protect the region from ex-
ternal pressures and allow it immersion in the international economy of
the time, was strongly affected by, and failed due to, among other factors,
the external debt crises. An antithetic outward-oriented strategy was em-
braced and is currently in place. As a result of the economic liberaliza-
tion and structural adjustment programs, and the tremendous effect of
neo-liberal policies on the approach of the countries towards regional in-
tegration, a worrying degree of vulnerability from external forces is still
present in all schemes.
The mid and late 1990s witnessed the Tequila crisis of 1994 ("the first
time that Latin America experienced an important impact generated by
financial globalization"), 174 the transnationalization of finance, the tele-
information revolution, the Asian (1997) and Russian (1998) crises, and
also the Brazil and Argentinean crises (starting in 1999). All of them
168. Id.; see also Robert Devlin & Antoni Estevadeordal, Trade And Cooperation: A
Regional Public Goods Approach (2002), http://www.netamericas.net/Documents/
Presentations2/PresentationNET%20AMERICAS% 200AS%202002_1.ppt;
Robert Devlin & Lucio Castro, Regional Banks and Regionalism: A New Frontier
for Development Financing 3 (Integration and Regional Programs Department,
Working Paper No. 13, 1DB, INTAL-ITD-STA, 2002), http://www.iadb.org/intal/
publicaciones/Devlin-CastroWP13.pdf or http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/
devlin-castro0202.pdf.
169. GUIDE, supra note 2, at 24.
170. Id.
171. See OPEN REGIONALISM, supra note 11; see also THOMAS ANDREW O'KEEFE,
LATIN AMERICAN TRADE AGREEMENTS (2001).
172. See Treaty on Free Trade, Colom.-Venez.-Mex., Jan. 1, 1995, available at http://
www.sice.oas.orgrTrade/G3_E/G3E.TOC.asp.
173. See Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Chile, June 6, 2003, available at http://www.
sice.oas.orgfTrade/chiusa e/chiusaind e.asp.
174. Juan F. Rojas Penso, The Effects of the Crisis on Integration, 57 CAPITULOS DEL
SELA 33, 33 (1999).
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evidenced the fragility of the region from externalities.
175
Notwithstanding the structural and second generation reforms placed
in the region, the impact of the circumstances affecting the international
economy and the local economic crisis led ECLAC again to speak of the
lost half decade of the Latin American and Caribbean region.1 76 Until
recently, sub-regions such as MERCOSUR and the Andean Community
had started to work on the establishment of harmonized macroeconomic
policies, particularly exchange, financial, and fiscal policies. To sum up,
regional integration in Latin America has been based on policies that un-
derlined trade in goods and did not prepare the region for the changes
and effects of the international economy, leaving it vulnerable to external
factors.
B. ARE THE ECONOMIES IN THE REGION REALLY OPEN?
In order to assess the question concerning the degree of openness of
the economies of the region, this section compares the twelve LAIA
country members during the period in which open regionalism has been
in place. To that end, it adopts the Index of Economic Freedom issued by
The Heritage Foundation and The Wall Street Journal. 177 The Index uses
a methodology that measures the degree of economic freedom in a con-
siderable number of countries around the globe.178
According to the Index, economic freedom is defined as "the absence
of government coercion or constraint on the production, distribution, or
consumption of goods and services beyond the extent necessary for citi-
zens to protect and maintain liberty itself.' ' 179 To measure economic free-
dom and rate each country, the authors of the Index established ten
broad categories or factors of economic freedom, which are weighted
equally.
These categories are trade policy, fiscal burden of government, govern-
ment intervention in the economy, monetary policy, capital flows and for-
eign investment, banking and finance, wages and prices, property rights,
regulation, and informal market activity. Each factor is graded according
to a unique scale that runs from one to five. A score of one signifies an
economic environment or set of policies that are most conducive to eco-
175. See SELA & AECI, THE ECONOMIC LABYRINTH: THE AGENDA OF LATIN
AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN TO COPE WITH THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL
CRISIS (1999).
176. ECLAC, PRELIMINARY OVERVIEW OF THE ECONOMIES OF LATIN AMERICA AND
THE CARIBBEAN (2003), available at http://www.eclac.cl/publicaciones/Desarrol-
loEconomico/3/LcG2223PI/cg2223-i.pdf; see also Norman Girvan, The Lost Half
Decade in Latin America and the Caribbean, http://www.acs-aec.org/column/
index66.htm.
177. For more information, see The Heritage Foundation, http://www.heritage.org/re-
search/features/index/ (last visited Oct. 5, 2005).
178. THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION & THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, INDEX OF Eco-
NOMIC FREEDOM 2004, ch. 5, 49-70 (explaining the methodology) (on file with
author).
179. Id. at 50.
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nomic freedom. A score of five signifies a set of policies that are least
conducive to economic freedom. The four broad categories of economic
freedom in the Index are as follows: Free-countries with an average
overall score of 1.99 or less; Mostly Free-countries with an average
overall score of 2.00 to 2.99; Mostly Unfree-countries with an average
overall score of 3.00 to 3.99; and Repressed-countries with an average
overall score of 4.00 or higher.
Table VI shows the overall score of the LAIA member countries dur-
ing the last ten years. Chile is the single country in the region which has
scored (in 2002 and 2004) within the category of those regarded as Free
countries by the Index. Chile is a member of none of the sub-regional
arrangements in Latin America, as it adopted an independent model of
development. The country has engaged individually in numerous trade
treaties not only with countries in the region, but also with the United
States. In this sense, the Index reflects the effects of the coherent exter-
nal policy of the country and the implementation of the reforms required
to immerse Chile in the global economy. But the average score of the last
ten years reveals it as a Mostly Free country.
The first four countries within the table comprise MERCOSUR. Ar-
gentina and Uruguay present an average that define them as Mostly Free
countries, whereas Brazil and Paraguay are among those regarded as
Mostly Unfree countries by the Index. During the last three years all
these countries have presented a tendency to increase their score that
reveals an inclination to close their markets. In contrast, the other
MERCOSUR member countries (except Paraguay) display an overall
tendency towards opening their markets, as can be seen by comparing
their score in 1995 with the average score of the last ten years.
The next five countries encompass the Andean Community. Two
members, Bolivia and Peru, are considered among the Mostly Free coun-
tries according to the average of the last ten years. Colombia, Ecuador,
and Venezuela rank as Mostly Unfree countries. Mexico, being a mem-
ber of NAFTA, registers an average that categorizes it as a Mostly Unfree
country. Only during the last three years has its score defined Mexico as
a Mostly Free country. But there is a slight tendency towards increasing
the score.
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Table VI Overall Score' 80
Country 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Average
Argentina 2.85 2.63 2.75 2.53 2.28 2.23 2.29 2.58 3.04 3.48 2.666
Brazil 3.46 3.56 3.28 3.36 3.19 3.46 3.21 3.06 3.01 3.10 3.269
Paraguay 2.94 2.89 2.91 3.04 3.00 3.01 3.39 3.28 3.40 3.39 3.125
Uruguay 3.03 2.85 2.60 2.59 2.60 2.50 2.30 2.51 2.45 2.55 2.598
Bolivia 3.21 2.61 2.56 2.61 2.61 2.61 2.31 2.66 2.59 2.59 2.636
Colombia 3.10 3.15 3.23 3.19 2.99 3.14 3.00 2.94 3.10 3.13 3.097
Ecuador 3.39 3.33 3.21 3.10 3.09 3.14 3.51 3.60 3.58 3.60 3.355
Peru 3.59 3.06 3.03 2.96 2.66 2.64 2.61 2.88 2.86 2.83 2.912
Venezuela 3.28 3.63 3.58 3.43 3.48 3.43 3.78 3.88 3.71 4.18 3.638
Chile 2.60 2.61 2.26 2.10 2.13 2.04 2.03 1.88 2.01 1.91 2.157
Mexico 3.10 3.31 3.35 3.41 3.25 3.09 3.05 2.96 2.81 2.90 3.123
Cuba 4.95 5.00 4.90 4.95 4.90 4.88 4.88 4.88 4.43 4.08 4.785
Table VII displays the first one of the ten categories or factors included
in the Index, as it is considered a key factor in measuring economic free-
dom: the trade policy. 181 "The trade policy score is based on a country's
weighted average tariff rate-weighted by imports from the country's
trading partners. The higher the rate, the worse (or higher) the score." 182
A score of one indicates that the level of protectionism is Very Low,
with the weighted average tariff rate less than or equal to 4 percent. With
a score of two, the level of protectionism is Low, with a weighted-average
tariff rate is greater than 4 percent but less than or equal to 9 percent. As
for scores of three, the level of protectionism is Moderate, and the
weighted average tariff rate is greater than 9 percent but less than or
equal to 14 percent. For scores of four, the level of protectionism is High,
with the weighted average tariff rate is greater than 14 percent but less
than or equal to 19 percent. Finally, with a score of five the level of pro-
tectionism is Very High as the weighted average tariff rate is greater than
19 percent.
Comparing the level of protectionism as it was evaluated in 1995 to the
average of each country during the last ten years reveals that all countries
except for Bolivia register a reduction in the score. It indicates an overall
tendency towards reducing protectionism. During the last three years,
however, the inclination of the countries has been either to preserve the
level of protectionism in place in 2002 or to augment it. Argentina, Bra-
zil, Paraguay, Ecuador, Venezuela, Chile, and Mexico kept the same
score. Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru, all members of the Andean Commu-
nity, increased it.
When examining the countries according to the sub-regional schemes,
the biggest countries within MERCOSUR display a tendency towards
180. INDEX OF ECONOMIc FREEDOM 2004, supra note 178.
181. Id. at 52-53.
182. Id. at 52.
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high protectionism. Argentina fluctuates between moderate and high
scores whereas Brazil ranks among high and very high protectionism. On
the contrary, the smallest countries are disposed towards low protection-
ism. The same score found in 1995 is present in all countries in 2002.
Except Uruguay, whose average declined one point in 2004, the other
three MERCOSUR countries have the same score.
The principle of open regionalism relies primarily on the fact that coun-
tries open their markets to trade with both members and non-members.
The Index shows that the actual level of protectionism is the same as the
one registered in 1995. Therefore, the Index suggests that open regional-
ism has made little impact in the sub-region during the last ten years as
far as trade policy is concerned.
In the case of the Andean Community, member countries show an
overall reduction in the score, when comparing the average of the last ten
years with that registered in 1995. Bolivia increased its score, as in 1995 it
ranked Low in protectionism, but it has moved to Moderate within the
last two years. Colombia, Ecuador, and Venezuela are countries inclined
to preserve the same level of protectionism recorded by the Index in
1995. Peru, which scored Very High on the scale in 1995, reached a Low
level for three years (1998-2000). But its tendency during the last four
years is for a High level of protectionism. As evidenced in the
MERCOSUR countries and based on the Index, trade policy in the An-
dean countries does not reflect the effects that the implementation of
open regionalism should produce.
Chile registers an important reduction of its position on the scale. In
1995 its level of protectionism was considered High. Since 1997 it has
recorded a Low level. The results are in accordance with the market-
oriented strategy of the country. Mexico has also decreased its score
from Moderate (1995) to Low (1999), excepting year 2000 when it ranked
High, returning to Low again the following year.
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Table VII: Trade Policy Score 183
Country 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Average
Argentina 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 4 4 4 3.7
Brazil 4 4 4 4 4 5 4 4 4 4 4.1
Paraguay 3 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 2.5
Uruguay 3 3 2 2 2 2 1 3 3 2 2.3
Bolivia 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3.5
Colombia 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 3.5
Ecuador 4 4 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 3.6
Peru 5 4 3 2 2 2 3 3 4 4 3.2
Venezuela 4 4 4 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 3.7
Chile 4 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2.4
Mexico 3 3 3 3 2 4 2 2 2 2 2.6
Cuba 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 3 3 4.6
After more than a decade of implementing policies and carrying out
structural reforms it seems that Latin American economies are not that
open, and integration with countries and schemes out of the region have
not yet been accomplished. Furthermore, there is a threatening tendency
towards protectionism with a certain degree of political populism that
may hinder the real efforts towards South-South and North-South
integration.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The propagation of regional, sub-regional, and bilateral treaties, insti-
tutions, and arrangements has responded to the valid aspiration of the
Latin American and Caribbean countries to explore the structures and
policies which better suit and represent the needs of their overall popula-
tion and interest groups.
This article has discussed South-South Latin American regionalism
from the perspective of its main features and their correlation with open
regionalism. Granting differential treatment and preferences has brought
about complexity, confusion, and legal uncertainty in the region. At the
same time, integration being a politically led process, political intrusion,
lack of understanding, improvisation, and incoherent strategies have af-
fected the process of integration as a whole, as the structures created to
implement it depend entirely on the political will of the governments.
Equally, the heavily institutionalized structures and forums have be-
come dysfunctional. As Latin American regionalism has the propensity
towards crowded internal structures, bureaucracy is a damaging conse-
quence. In addition, governments seek forums different from those al-
ready created within the regions or sub-regions. This duplicates efforts
and makes inefficient use of the limited resources. Furthermore, regional
183. INDEX OF ECONOMIC FREEDOM 2004, supra note 178.
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integration in Latin America has been based on policies that underlined
trade in goods and do not prepare the region for the changes and effects
of the international economy, leaving it defenseless against external
factors.
As the definition of open regionalism contains the features present in
the Latin American processes of integration, their weaknesses affect not
only the region but also its relationships with other countries and blocs.
Regional Integration in Latin America is akin to an organic process. Its
common elements interact together affecting each other organically;
therefore, all must be fine-tuned. By strengthening countries' weak-
nesses, open regionalism will contribute to the construction of building
blocks aimed at procuring a balanced immersion within the global
economy.
In this regard, there is a need to articulate the various regional, sub-
regional, trilateral, and bilateral treaties in order to direct open regional-
ism towards more effective multilateralism. Convergence should be at-
tained through the different mechanisms established within LAIA and by
the political will of the governments of the member countries, aimed at
clarifying and establishing a common treatment of the products within
the region, bearing in mind the principle of differential treatment. The
implementation of the agreed Free Trade Area between the Andean
Community and MERCOSUR should end the complexity created by the
Regional and partial scope agreements actually in force.
The recent developments within the region and the negotiations to-
wards a hemispheric agreement require the governments to use, sustain,
modernize, and consolidate the regional institutions, bodies, and organs
in charge of providing articulation and coordination. It implies a serious
effort of coordination among domestic government officials, decision-
making bodies, and organs of consultation.
The evolution and dynamism of the process have produced a complex
network of bodies, institutions, and organs, which have lost their influ-
ence in procuring the required convergence, coordination, and coopera-
tion. By re-examining the Latin American and the Caribbean integration
framework and correcting the weaknesses present in the features dis-
cussed, the region as a bloc will find a balanced immersion in the global
economy. As all this requires a major political commitment, much work
needs to be done in order to put pressure on the Latin American govern-
ments to plan, carry out, and comply with the reforms needed.
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